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REFORMING THE LAWS AND PRACTICE
OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
By custom and long-standing federal statute, diplomatic agents
of foreign nations sent to the United States have been accorded liberal immunities from local civil and criminal jurisdiction. 1 Until recently, approximately 19,000 persons, including family members,
were entitled to such diplomatic immunity in Washington, D.C.
alone. 2 The privilege of diplomatic immunity has sometimes been
abused. Traffic accidents resulting in uncompensated property
damage and personal injuries, unpaid parking tickets, and ignored
contracts obligations are several of the types of abuses spawned by
this immunity. 3
As a result of public criticism and increasingly strained reiations
between diplomatic communities and local communities, Congress
recently enacted legislation that dramatically changes United
States diplomatic immunity law. 4 This legislation eliminates the
complete immunity from criminal and civil law proceedings that
was afforded most foreign diplomats and their staffs, and establishes the rules of the Vienna Convention on Diplomati~ Relations 5
as the measure of diplomatic immunity in the United States. 6 This
article will examine the theoretical justification for diplomatic immunity and its application in the United States. The manner in
1 Diplomatic agents have been generally immune from arrest or imprisonment and exempt
from criminal and civil suit in the host country. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (4th
ed. 1965). Under former United States law, any judicial process initiated against a foreign
diplomat was deemed null and void. 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976)(repealed 1978). See notes 19-22
and accompanying text infra.
2 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcommittee
on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Diplomatic
Privileges and Immunities Hearings] (letter from Douglas J. Bennett, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations to the Hon. Joseph L. Fisher, Chairman, Subcommittee on
International Operations). Additionally, there are concentrations of diplomatic personnel in
other United States cities, particularly in New York.
3 See, e.g.,.Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42; Detroit Free Press, Jan. 18, 1978, at IA, col. 3. It is clear that past
diplomatic immunity laws shielded diplomatic personnel from the consequences of acts
which would result in arrest, trial, and punishment if committed by Americans.
4
H.R. 7819, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 7877 (1977) passed the House of Representatives July 27, 1977. An amended version of H.R. 7819 passed the Senate August 17,
1978. 124 CONG. REc. 13695 (1978). The Senate amendments were agreed to by the House.
124 CONG. REc. 10004 (1978). The President approved the legislation Sept. 30, 1978. This
act, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978), is discussed at pp. 100-10 infra.
5
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. See text accompanying notes 42-63 infra.
6
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
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which the recently enacted legislation alters United States diplomatic immunity law, as well as the reasoning and possible impact
of such law reform, also will be discussed.
I.

RATIONALE FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The concept of diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest and
most universally recognized principles of international law and is
embodied in international custom, practice, and agreements. 7 Although its application in practice varies among nations, diplomatic
immunity may be defined broadly as "the freedom from local jurisdiction accorded under international law by the receiving state to
duly accredited diplomatic officers, their families and servants. " 8
Until recently, the United States has granted complete immunity to
all foreign nationals in the employ of an embassy who are not permanent residents and are assigned the proper nonimmigrant visa
status. By special statutes, diplomatic immunity is enjoyed by the
permanent representatives of country missions to the United Nations and the Organization of American States as well as by the top
officials of the United Nations. 9
Diplomatic officers are generally accorded certain privileges
with respect to such matters as exemptions from customs duties
and local taxation. Although often associated with diplomatic immunity, such privileges are not embraced in thatterm and are not
discussed in this note. 1 0
Three theories commonly have been proposed to justify the historical practice of according diplomats certain immunities. 11 The
theory of personal representation considers the dipJomatic envoy
to be the personification of the state he represents. Because the
7
4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 400 (1942); M. OGDON, JURlDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 2 (1936); H. RIEFF', DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND PRACTICE- 6 (1954); Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity From
Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application in
United States Practice, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 173 (1%0); Preuss, Capacity for Legation
and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 170 (1932-33).
8 Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development
Under International Law and Application in United States Practice, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL.
173 (1%0).
9 See Convention on Privileges and lmmuniiies of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21
U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900; 22 V.S.C. § 288 (g) (1976) (provision extending certain immunities to representatives of member states of the Council of the Organization of American
States).
10
See 26 U.S.C. § 893 (1976) regarding exemption from federal income tax for alien employees of foreign governments. For postal privileges, see 39 U.S.C. § 4168 (1976). United
States customs regulations provide for the extension of custom courtesies and free entry
privileges to foreign diplomatic personnel, if reciprocal privileges are granted by the foreign
government to United States personnel of comparable status. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 148.86-.90
(1977).
11 See M. OGDON, supra note 7, at 63-94, 105-65, 166-94.
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representative is endowed with the sovereignty of the state, he is
given special immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving state. 12 The theory of exterritorality explains immunity by
considering the diplomat to be on the soil of his native country.
Thus, the diplomatic agent is said not to be subject to local law because, within the contemplation of law, he is not present in the host
country .13
Rather than relying on the legal fictions of these two theories, the
modem justification for diplomatic immunity is grounded in the
theory of functional necessity . 14 This theory suggests that diplomats must be granted a privileged status affording freedom of
movement and communication if they are to fulfill their functions
in foreign states and thereby facilitate relations between nations. 15
The effective performance of diplomatic functions is only possible
if diplomatic representatives are uninhibited by harassment or intimidation.16
The theory of functional necessity is more pragmatic and realistic than the other theories justifying diplomatic immunity, 17 yet it
does present some difficulties. Grants of immunity under the functional necessity theory can be justified only if the exercise of particular diplomatic functions requires the extension of such immunity. Consequently, it is necessary to identify both the functions essential to the accepted practice of diplomacy and the degree of immunity necessary to facilitate the performance of those functions.18
12
This legal fiction is recognized in Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y.
1946) where the court observed inter alia that "a foreign minister is immune from the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the courts in the country to which he is accredited, on the
ground that he is the representative, the alter ego, of his sovereign who is, of course, entitled
to such immunity." Id. at 341.
13
See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Wilson v. Blanco, 56 N.Y.
Super. Ct. 582, 4 N. Y.S. 714 (1889).
14
See C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 20 (1967).
15
This view is expressed in the frequently quoted letter from Secretary of State Elihu
Root to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, March 16, 1906:

The reason of the immunity of diplomatic agents is clear, namely: that Governments may not be hampered in their foreign relations by the arrest or forcible prevention of the exercise of a duty in the person of a governmental agent or representative .... It likewise follows from the necessity of the case, that the diplomatic
agent must have full access to the accrediting state, else he cannot enter upon the
performance of his specific duty, and it is equally clear that he must be permitted to
return to the home country in the fulfillment of official duty.
4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 400, at 513 (1942).
18
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 73,
Comment at 229-30 (1965).
17
The theory of functional necessity finds support in the case law. See Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick,
214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
18
C. WILSON, supra note 14, at 22.
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AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY LAW

PRIOR TO THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT OF

1978

A. The 1790 Statute

In 1790, the United States enacted laws 19 which were declaratory of international law and designed to give the principle of diplomatic immunity local application. 20 The 1790 statute effectively
guaranteed diplomatic agents freedom from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the United States or any state. Foreign diplomatic
personnel accredited to the United States government were immune from arrest or imprisonment and their property could not be
seized or attached. Any writ or process issued against such persons
was null and void. 2 1 Persons who obtained or executed a writ or
process against diplomatic personnel were subject to fines and up
to three years imprisonment. 22
The courts broadly construed the immunity provision. The immunity which it provided was not confined to those actions which
had as a direct objective the seizure or attachment of goods or chattels. 23 Moreover, this statute had been interpreted to provide absolute immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction not only for the
diplomatic agent but also for members of his immediate family and
members of the diplomat's administrative, technical, and service
staff. 24 This immunity also extended by statute to private servants
in the household of the diplomat, provided they were foreign nationals with proper visa status. 25 American citizens registered with
the Department of State who were in the service of foreign diplomatic missions were also exempt from judicial process, except
for suits arising out of debts contracted before they entered upon
such service. 26

22 U .S.C. §§ 252-54 (1976) (repealed 1978).
United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
21
22 U .S.C. § 252 (1976) (repealed 1978). This section was derived from an act of Parliament passed in 1708, 7 Anne, c. 12 (1708), when diplomatic relations between Great Britain
and Russia were jeopardized by the arrest for debt of the Russian Ambassador to London.
Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 228 (1945).
22
22 U.S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978
(D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held that a United States Marshall was justified in refusing to
serve a summons on a Tunisian Ambassador because the ambassador's diplomatic immunity
would be violated by the service of process. The court stated: ••For although courts will not
allow a marshal! to avoid his duty to serve process merely because he notices the availability
of a defense to the suit, they must protect him if service would violate international law and
might subject him to the criminal law of the United States." Id. at 979.
23 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
24
Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927); Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc.
656, 206 N.Y.S. 40 (1924).
25 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1976) (repealed 1978).
2
• 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1976) (repealed 1978).
19

20
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Under the 1790 statute, diplomatic agents, however, were not totally exempt from the restraints of United States law. By initiating
a law suit, an individual entitled to diplomatic immunity effectively
waived his immunity and subjected himself to counterclaims directly connected with the original claim. 27 The waiver of immunity
arising as a result of suit, however, did not constitute a waiver of
immunity from execution of resulting judgments. 28 Diplomatic immunity also could be waived by the embassy or foreign government
involved. 29 However, even when such immunity had been waived,
there was a reluctance to sue because anyone who wrongfully sued
or criminally prosecuted a diplomat could be fined or sent to jail. 30
Diplomats immune from judicial process, however, were still
subject to extra-judicial sanctions. A formal complaint could be
submitted to the offending diplomat's government, or an official
request made for his recall. Alternatively, the federal government
could declare him persona non grata and order the offender to
leave the country .31 These sanctions were sparingly employed,
however, and were reserved for the most outrageous circumstances.32 Moreover, removal of foreign officials did not compensate residents of the United States who may have been seriously injured by the unlawful or negligent actions of the offending
diplomatic official. The Department of State often intervened and,
in appropriate cases, attempted to bring disputes to the attention of
the diplomat's embassy with a request that it promote a just settlement.33 However, a number of United States citizens have been
unable to obtain compensation or satisfactory resolution of disputes despite the efforts of the Department of State. 34
In providing broad protection for all diplomatic personnel, the
1790 statute was designed to meet the conditions of diplomacy in
the eighteenth century. At that time, there were only small numbers of diplomats in this country and most were directly engaged in
actual diplomatic functions with the United States. Given the
greatly expanded staffs of current diplomatic missions, the extensive immunity granted in 1790 is not justified, since many such personnel do not perform diplomatic functions and the immunity is
27 RESfATEMENT (SECOND), -FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 79, at
248 (1965).
28 Id. Cf. Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927).
29
Id. See also United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3rd Cir. 1967), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968); United States v. Arizti,
229 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
30 See 22 U.S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978).
31 Barnes, supra note 8, at 1n.
32
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 217.
33 Id. at 216.
34
See note 3 supra.
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subject to abuse. Accordingly, a systematic reduction of diplomatic immunity would not interfere with diplomatic efforts, would reduce abuse of the immunity, and is consistent with the functional
necessity theory, which has been adopted by most other countries. 35

B. Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity
Through diplomatic immunity, governments ensure that dip1omatic personnel can carry out their legitimate functions. However, the benefits of improved international relations derived from
these grants of immunity must be balanced against the obligation of
the receiving government to protect the interests of its citizens. Although most members of the diplomatic community are respectful
of United States laws and regulations, abuses of diplomatic immunity result in needless personal hardship to innocent American citizens and strained relations with local governments. As a result of
these abuses, the media coverage and local opinion, particularly in
New York and Washington, D.C., have become increasingly critical of diplomatic immunity. 36
Some of the most frequent problems raised in connection with
diplomatic immunity involved disobedience of local laws and regulations, particularly those relating to the use of-automobiles. For
example, in New York City alone diplomats are respo]!_sible for
over 200,000 parking tickets annually. Only one percent of the
parking tickets are ever paid, so that the city loses approximately
five million dollars a year. 37 In the District of Columbia diplomatic
personnel were accountable for 37,905 unpaid parking tickets between January 1, 1976 and March 31, 1977. This represents
$1,070,000 in fines and penalties. 38
Unsatisfied tort claims, primarily those resulting from automobile accidents, result in the denial of compensation to injured
United States citizens. 39 Disputes arising out of contracts, including broken apartment leases, bad checks, unhonored personal contracts, and other similar transactions present similar problems of
35
Over one hundred nations have signed the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, which provides a narrower grant of diplomatic immunity than does the 1790 statute. See notes 42-63 and accompanying text infra.
38
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42.
37
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48-49.
38 ld. at 49.
39
See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42. In April 1974 a George Washington University
professor was injured by a cultural attache of the Panamanian Embassy in an automobile
accident. The former professor is now a quadriplegic and will require full-time nursing for
the remainder of her life. The Panamanian was not insured and suit could not be brought
because of the official's diplomatic immunity.
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innocent parties unfairly suffering financial loss. 40 The Department
of State has been notified less frequently of claims made by United
States citizens against diplomatic personnel involving divorce and
non-support, disorderly conduct, and theft. 4 1
While relatively few people or communities are adversely affected by claims of diplomatic immunity, these abuses emphasized
the need for the United States to bring its laws into conformity with
generally accepted international practice as codified in the Vienna
Convention.
Ill.

VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Although United States law formerly extended full diplomatic
immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction to all foreign nationals employed by a foreign embassy, many nations long ago curtailed their grant of a similar blanket immunity. Well over one
hundred of these nations are signatories of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations, 42 a comprehensive international codification of the immunities extended to members of permanent diplomatic missions and their families. 43 The Vienna Convention adopts
the functional approach to diplomatic immunity in that it accords
varying degrees of immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction to
various categories of embassy functionaries and their family members. 44 The Vienna Convention confers immunity only where
necessary to ensure that the diplomatic personnel of foreign governments can carry out their functions free of unreasonable restraints imposed by local authorities. Under a functional necessity
analysis, blanket immunity for diplomatic agents, their families,
40 See Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48. For example,
the wife of the late dean of the White House Press Corps rented a home to a legal attache at
the French Embassy. She alleged that the diplomat caused $11,000 worth of damage to the
house, but she could not collect because of diplomatic immunity.
A New York landlord sold a four story building to the Congo as headquarters for the African nation's mission to the United Nations. The Congolese refused to make the quarterly
payments on their $400,000 mortgage. The landlord attempted to foreclose on the Congolese
and have them evicted, but they claimed that diplomatic immunity prohibited their eviction.
See Detroit Free Press, Jan. 18, 1978, at IA, col. 3.
41 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 214-15.
42
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
43 In drafting its provisions, the Convention examined the entire body of law and practice
of diplomatic intercourse and immunities since 1815. International Law Commission Report,
13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 11-27, U.N. Doc. N3859 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 230, 253-91 (1959).
44
The Convention "does at least formulate rules relating to status, privilege and immunities with consistent regard to what is reasonable and necessary between sovereign
states." Simmonds, The Rationale of Diplomatic Immunity, II INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1204,
1210 (1962).
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employees, and domestic servants cannot be justified as it was
under earlier practice and theory.
The Vienna Convention differs in several respects from the repealed statutory law of the United States. Under the 1790 statute,
diplomatic agents duly accredited to the United States, and members of their immediate families residing with them, and members
of the diplomat's administrative, technical, and service staff were
accorded full civil and criminal immunity from the jurisdiction of
the United States. 45 Under the Vienna Convention, diplomatic
agents 46 and their families, 47 and most members of the embassy
staff are fully exempt from criminal jurisdiction, but immunity from
civil process is limited to reflect the functional requirements of different positions. 48 This reduction of the traditionally extensive diplomatic immunity can be attributed to the increasing acceptance of
the functional necessity theory, which is recognized in the Vienna
Convention. The Convention's preamble states that the purpose of
diplomatic privileges and immunities is "to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing
states.' ' 49
The Vienna Convention gives diplomats and their immediate
families full immunity from criminal and civil prosecution. 50 Administrative and technical staff 51 of an embassy have full immunity
from criminal jurisdiction, but are exempted from civil process
only for their official acts. 52 The families of such staff members are
immune from criminal prosecution but are not granted any civil
immunity. 53 Members of the service staff 54 are granted civil and
45
Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618, 224 N .Y.S. 389 (1927); Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc.
656,206 N.Y.S. 40 (1924). See text accompanying notes 24-26supra.
46
A "diplomatic agent" is defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3231, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, as the head of the diplomatic
mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission.
47
The Convention provides complete civil and criminal immunity for members of the family of the diplomatic agent forming part of his household. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
48
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
A review of the debate and consideration cr amendments to the Vienna Convention indicates that there was support for significant limitations on diplomatic immunity. See Kerley,
Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse Immunities, 56 AM. J.
INT'L L. 88 (1962).
49
23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
50
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
51
The administrative and technical staff includes archivists, clerks, secretaries, stenographers, messengers, and interpreters. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr.
18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
52
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U .S.T. 3227,
3244; T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
53
Id. These family members were fully subject to criminal and civil jurisdiction under the
1790 statute. 22 U.S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed 1978).
54
The Convention defines members of the service staff as those in the domestic service of
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criminal immunity only for their official acts, 55 and their families
are fully subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. 56 Private servants 57 of diplomatic agents are not accorded any immunity .58
The United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1961, and it
entered into force with respect to the United States in 1972. 59 Since
the Vienna Convention is self-executing, no legislation is needed to
implement the treaty. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, treaties confirmed by the Senate, along
with the Constitution and acts of Congress made pursuant thereto,
are "the supreme law of the land." 60 Generally, when there is a
conflict between a treaty and an act of Congress the last expression
of the sovereign will controls. 61 However, despite the fact that
immunity standards set forth in the treaty are more restrictive than
those incorporated in the 1790 statute, the statute continued to
govern the availability of diplomatic immunity where the Convention did not apply. This result was consistent with the Convention,
for article 47 clearly states that a broader conferral of immunity
may be granted by the receiving state despite the narrower scope of
immunity provided in the Convention. 62 Both the Department of
Justice and the Department of State indicated that the Vienna Convention, while it became the law of the land, did not impliedly re-

the mission. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 3230, T.l.A.S. No. 7502.
55
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3244, T.l.A.S. No. 7502.
56
Id. Families of service staff were not accorded any immunity under the 1790 statute. 22
U.S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed 1978).
57
The Convention defines a private servant as a person who is in the domestic service of a
member of a mission and who is not an employee of the sending state. Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.l.A.S. No. 7502.
58
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. Such servants were entitled to full criminal and civil immunity regardless of their nationality under the 1790 statute. 22 U .S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed
1978).
59
The Convention was signed on behalf of the United States June 29, 1961 and ratified by
the U.S. Senate on November 8, 1972. Ratification was deposited with the United Nations
Secretary General on November 13, 1972 and the Convention entered into force with respect to the United States on December 13, 1972. See H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
60
U.S. CON~. art. VI, § 2.
61
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
62
Article 47 disallows discrimination between states in the application of the Convention,
but it does make allowance for reciprocity and finds no illegitimate discrimination
where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present Convention
restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provision to its mission in
the sending State; [or] ... where by custom or agreement States extend to each
other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present
Convention.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 47, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3249,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502.
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peal the 1790 domestic law of immunity. 63 Consequently, the
sweeping diplomatic immunity provided by the 1790 statute continued to be effective. Repeal of the 1790 statute was necessary to
allow the United States to apply the immunity provisions of the
Vienna Convention and bring United States law into line with those
of other countries.
IV.

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT

The Diplomatic Relations Act (DRA) of 1978 was signed into law
on September 30, 1978, 64 repealing the 1790 statute and leaving the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as the sole basis for
diplomatic immunity in the United States. 65 It also establishes a
mandatory liability insurance requirement for all embassy personnel and their families who operate motor vehicles, vessels, or aircraft in the United States. 66 The President is granted discretion to
extend, on a reciprocal basis, more favorable or less favorable
treatment to diplomatic personnel than the Convention specifies. 67
The Act also provides a mechanism for dismissal of actions by a
judicial tribunal where immunity is found to exist, 68 and grants federal district courts jurisdiction of civil actions against diplomatic
personnel. 69
A. Repeal of the 1790 Statute

The DRA ends the broad immunity extending beyond that
granted by the Vienna Convention and brings our domestic law
into conformity with the law of the other nations that have signed
the Convention. Additionally, the Act stipulates that the Convention shall apply to the representatives of all nations irrespective of
whether a nation has ratified it, thus providing uniform treatment
for all members of the diplomatic community. 70
63
The Department of Justice memorandum was published in [1973) DIGEsr OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, and the State Department ruling was published in [1975) DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 242.
64
See note 4 supra.
85 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978). See notes
70- 76 and accompanying text infra.
66
Id.·§ 6. See notes 77-103 and accompanying text infra.
67
Id. § 4. See notes 104-09 and accompanying text infra.
68
Id. § 5. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text infra.
69
Id. § 8. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text infra.
70

Id.

§

3.
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The ORA extends the diplomatic immunity provided by the
Convention to all embassy and mi'ssion personnel in the United
States, and to all United Nations personnel in New York, as well as
to their families. 71 By fully embracing the Convention, the Congress has effectively adopted the functional analysis and reduced
the blanket immunity which many diplomats enjoyed and some
abused. 72 Senior diplomatic personnel retain their comprehensive
immunity, while lower level personnel retain their immunity only
while they are engaged in official embassy business. Arguably, the
remaining immunity is necessary to the exercise of the diplomatic
function and to the protection of the channels of diplqmatic intercourse.
Repeal of the 1790 statute remedies the overwhelming majority
of problems which Americans have encountered in their relations
with members of the diplomatic community. The ORA terminates
civil immunity for many lower echelon officials and their families.
In Washington, O.C., for example, there were approximately 6,000
embassy personnel, excluding family members, who were immune
from civil action. Under the Act, approximately 4,000 of these officials are subject to normal civil suit for their unofficial acts. 73 Thus,
this measure is a significant step in providing legal relief for United
States citizens involved in civil disputes with embassy personnel.
Although the ORA allows diplomatic agents, administrative and
technical staff, and their families full immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the United States, members of the service staff only
have immunity from the criminal jurisdiction for their official acts,
and private servants no longer have any criminal immunity. 74
71
The ORA defines mission as follows: "The term mission includes missions within the
meaning of the Vienna Convention and any missions representing foreign governments, individually or collectively, which are extended the same privileges and immunities, pursuant
to law, as are enjoyed by missions under the Vienna Convention .... " Id. § 2.
This expansive concept of mission includes any permanent or special diplomatic mission
accredited or recognized by the United States, such as the Commission of the European
Communities. Since they perform the essential functions of diplomatic missions they receive
the same kind of treatment.
Additionally, several statutes or agreements require the granting of diplomatic immunities
to personnel of various organizations similar to diplomatic missions that are accredited to
the United States. The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, and the provision extending certain immunities to representatives of member states of the Council of the Organization of American
States (OAS), 22 U.S.C. § 288(g) (1976), read in conjunction with the Diplomatic Relations
Act, make it clear that United Nations and OAS delegations are considered part of the diplomatic community and are entitled to immunity under the Vienna Convention.
72
During the hearings on the DRA, Evan V. Dubelle, Chief of Protocol, Department of
State, criticized the 1790 statute for its failure to reflect the functional approach: "[T]here is
a clear need to limit the application of diplomatic immunity to the purpose for which it has
historically been intended, namely, to ensure the legitimate, unimpaired conduct of official
relations bet wen a diplomatic mission as representative of the sending country and the host
country .... " Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 62.
73
Id. at 6.
74
See notes 46-58 and accompanying text supra.
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Thus, passage of the DRA offers a deterrent to these members of
the diplomatic community from engaging in criminal actions. As
the DRA ends civil immunity for a large number of lower echelon
embassy officials and their families, efforts could be made to transfer parking violations from the local criminal codes to the civil
code, as has been done in New York. 75 Jurisdiction would thereby
be established over a great portion of the diplomatic community,
providing a solution to problems of unpaid parking tickets. 76
B. Requirement of Liability Insurance

Under former diplomatic immunity law no adequate mechanism
existed to compensate individuals injured by the negligent use of
automobiles or by other tortious actions committed by diplomatic
personnel. Although repeal ·of the 1790 statute exposes significant
numbers of diplomatic personnel to civil liability, there are still
many diplomats and their families who are completely immune
from civil or criminal proceedings. Thus, an American citizen who
is injured by the negligent action of an individual enjoying diplomatic immunity, would still be unable to bring suit to collect damages
under the DRA.
In 1976, Congress took a step toward remedying this problem by
enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 77 The Act
allows recovery against foreign nations for most tortious acts
committed by their officials and employees while acting within the

75
See H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1978).
·
78
During the hearings prior to passage of the DRA in the House of Representatives some
Congressmen suggested that various municipalities be compensated by the federal government for revenue lost as a result of unpaid parking tickets of the diplomatic community.
Congressman Solarz expressed his support for such a provision:
P-arking violations involve problems of safety, of unpaid bills to jurisdictions that
badly need the money, of police time spent making out such tickets, and of interference with the conduct of local business. If the United States picks up the cost of
hosting visiting foreign dignitaries, as it often does, I believe that making restitution
for diplomatic parking tickets should likewise be considered a cost of foreign policy
that the federal government should bear. At a minimum, the adoption of this provision will force the State Department to be more vigilant in the effort to force foreign
diplomats to pay up.
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 49.
Although the DRA eliminates diplomatic immunity in civil cases for two-thirds of the
foreign diplomats in this country, the compensation fund approach would provide a
mechanism for reimbursing municipalities for the remaining damage done by those diplomats retaining comprehensive immunity. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
However, such a provision was not included in the bill ultimately passed by the Congress.
77
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). For legislative history and purpose of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, see [1976] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604.
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scope of their duties, 78 and it permits execution against any insurance policy held by the foreign nation covering such accidents. 79
While this measure provides some remedy for American citizens it
.does not guarantee compensation, because a foreign nation is not
required under the FSIA to have or obtain insurance. Moreover,
the FSIA does not cover situations where the injurious acts are
committed outside the scope of the agent's or employee's duties or
during the exercise of a discretionary function.
The DRA attempts to fill a portion of this gap by requiring members of the diplomatic community to carry liability insurance. 80
Specifically, the DRA requires liability insurance to cover risks
arising from the operation of any motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft
in the United States. 81 This requirement is applicable to members
of missions, their families, and the missions themselves. The adoption of this requirement makes United States law similar to most
European countries, which require that members of the diplomatic
community possess auto insurance as a condition of entry into the
country. 82
Under the DRA, the President is required to establish regulations to specify liability insurance requirements. 83 To guarantee
compliance with these requirements, the President is authorized to
"take such steps as he may deem necessary to insure that each
mission, members of the mission and their families ... comply with
the requirements established. " 84
Various approaches could be taken by the State Department,
acting on behalf of the President, to enforce the compulsory insurance requirement. For example, the approach utilized in European
countries could be employed, whereby a diplomat must show evidence of insurance before he is issued a license plate for his car or
registration for his aircraft or vessel. 85 If a person seeking diplomatic status failed to comply with the insurance requirement, the Department of State could invoke such administrative actions as persona non grata proceedings, requiring the individual to leave the
78

28 U.S.C. § Hi05(a)(5) (1976).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5) (1976). Subject to existing international agreements, 28
U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) provides generally that the property in the United States of a foreign
state shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and execution. The provision reflects the
traditional view in the United States that the property of foreign states is absolutely immune
from execution. See Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jamvagsstryelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1930); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Banlt, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469,473
(1959). However, 28 U .S.C. §§ 1610, 1611 ( 1976) modify this rule and set forth various exceptions to this immunity from attachment and execution.
0
•
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 6, 92 Stat. 809 (1978).
8
' Id.
82
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 15.
83 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 6, 92 Stat. 809 (1978).
•• Id.
85
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 120. However, the Act
79
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country. 86 Alternatively, compliance with the insurance requirement could be checked at the point of accreditation or acceptance,
when the official status of various diplomatic personnel is recognized by the United States. 87 This last approach is undoubtedly
preferable; it ensures that all diplomatic personnel entering the
country will comply with the insurance requirement, yet it avoids
the extreme action of persona non grata proceedings. However,
the persona non grata approach could be employed where diplomats obtain insurance only to enter the country and subsequently
allow their policies to lapse.
With the DRA ensuring that all missions possess motor vehicle,
vessel, or aircraft liability insurance, the FSIA can become an effective measure allowing a person iajured by certain tortious acts
to sue the foreign state directly and execute on the insurance which
it is required to carry. Thus, when diplomatic personnel inflict tortious injures with an auto while acting within the scope of their official duties, liability can be imposed upon the foreign state itself. 88
Repeal of the 1790 statute and adoption of the DRA subjects lower
echelon officials to legal process in all civil matters. 89 Consequently, the compulsory insurance requirement 9f the DRA can
ensure that Americans injured by the tortious acts of such officials
committed while driving will receive adequate compensation regardless of whether the officials were acting within the scope of
their duties. However, if a senior diplomat, retaining comprehensive civil and criminal immunity but possessing liability insurance,
tortiously injuries an American citizen in an auto accident while
engaged in his private affairs, the victim is precluded from suing
and attaining redress because of the diplomat's civil immunity. 90
Additionally, because the insurance company is subrogated to all ·
the rights of the insured diplomat, the company could plead diplomatic immunity as a defense if sued directly .91 Thus, compulsory
auto liability insurance in this situation would not provide a comspecifies that the insurance must cover operation of motor vehicles and not merely their
ownership, so that this approach would be incomplete.
86
See text at note 31 supra.
81
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 129. The Department
of State can attach conditions to the acceptance of diplomatic personnel into this country, so
long as the conditions do not unduly interfere with the efficient functioning of the mission.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 74,
Comment bat 235 (1965).
88
28 U.S.C. § l(i()5 (1976). See also [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6619-20.
89
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
90
As indicated above, senior diplomats retain their complete civil and criminal immunity
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
91
It is well recognized that the insurer can take nothing by subrogation but the rights of
the insured. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 175 U.S. 91
(1899); Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U.S. 99 (1893).
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prehensive solution, since injured parties cannot successfully sue
senior diplomats in order to obtain compensation. The DRA
reaches an adequate solution to this problem by avoiding the common law rule requiring a negligently injured party to assert a damage claim against the tortfeasor personally .92 The measure provides for direct enforcement of the policy against the insurer in the
federal courts when the insured diplomat enjoys immunity from
suit. 93 Such an approach is presently being utilized by a number of
European countries. 94 Similar direct actions against insurers are
utilized by numerous states 95 and such actions have been upheld
by the Supreme Court. 96
Since a direct cause of action against insurers of diplomats is
based on the DRA, it is available even in those jurisdictions where
state law does not create a direct cause of action against insurers.
This is significant, as none of the jurisdictions in which the problem
of traffic accidents caused by foreign diplomats is most pronounced (District of Columbia, Maryland, New York, and Virginia) has a direct action statute.
The DRA prevents the insurer from asserting the diplomatic immunity of the insured as a defense against any claim covered by the
policy. 97 Additionally, the DRA prohibits the defense that the insured diplomat is an indispensable party and prohibits the insurer
from asserting a defense based on breach of contract in certain circumstances. 98 The principal purpose of the direct action statute, to
establish the superiority of the rights of the injured over the rights
of the insurer or insured, would be emasculated if technical defenses were allowed. Thus, a claimant under a direct action statute
asserts an independent right and does not claim as a successor in
interest of either party to the original contract of insurance.
By permitting direct suit against the fosurer, the measure avoids
the necessity of initiating legal proceedings against diplomats, thus
respecting their personal inviolability. The direct action device is
necessary to complete the statutory framework to enable the citi-

Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 7, 92 Stat. 809 (1978).
/d.
The European Convention on Compulsory Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect
of Motor Vehicles of April 20, 1959, 720 U.N.T.S. ll9 (1970), is in force in many European
countries. This multilateral convention requires each signatory state to enact domestic legislation providing for mandatory insurance and a right in the injured party to proceed directly
against insurers.
95
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 102. See also 12 G.
CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 45:816 (2d ed. 1964).
96
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In this case a
unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana direct action statute.
97
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 7, 92 Stat. 809 (1978).
92

93
94

98

/d.
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zens of the United States to obtain redress in the courts against officials of foreign states. 99
A particular weakness of the ORA is that it does not provide for
the compensation of injury resulting from torts or abuses of diplomatic immunity other than those involving use of motor vehicles,
aircraft, or vessels. In the House hearings held prior to passage of
the ORA, a proposal was considered which might have remedied
this deficiency. 100 This proposal involved the establishment of an
insurance fund financed by the federal government to compensate
personal injury or financial loss occasioned by the actions of
foreign officials protected by diplomatic immunity. The measure
would have created a Bureau of Claims within the Department of
State to award compensation in such cases.
The rationale suggested for such a federally financed insurance
fund was that the federal government, by granting diplomatic immunity as a matter of national policy, has an obligation to compensate its citizens injured as a result of that policy. However, this approach met resistance in the hearings and was not included in the
final bill reported out of committee. The Department of Justice advocated compulsory insurance coverage coupled with the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act as the best approach 101 and opposed the
creation of a fund, indicating that there was no precedent for such a
measure in Anglo-American civil, or international law. 102 Compulsory insurance avoids the need for new administrative machinery
for the handling of tort claims and imposes the obligation to satisfy
tort claims on the tortfeasor, not on the American public. Additionally, the financed insurance fund would provide little incentive
for the foreign diplomat to exercise care, since a negligent official
would not be required to compensate his victim. 103

99
It should be pointed out that the direct action device creates problems for the insurance
industry. After the ORA becomes law, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations governs diplomatic immunity in the United States. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, no diplomatic agent can be obliged to give evidence as a witness. Accordingly, the diplomat would be free to refuse to cooperate in the defense of the action by the insurer.
Further, the standard cooperation clause in automobile liability policies could be ignored by
the diplomat. The diplomat could even neglect to report the accident to the insurance company in contravention of the standard insurance contract.
100 See H.R. 7309, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (establishes within the Department of State
a Bureau of Claims Against Foreign Diplomats with responsibility for awarding full and just
compensation to persons injured by foreign diplomats and for reimbursing local governments for revenues lost because of their liability to collect parking fines from foreign diplomats).
101
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 94-95.
102 Id.
103
Id. at 87.
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C. Authority to Extend More Favorable or Less Favorable Treat-

ment to Members of Diplomatic Missions
The United States acted cautiously in reforming the law of diplomatic immunity because it has sizeable diplomatic missions
throughout the world. Diplomatic immunity is an area in which
governments are expected to reciprocate in the extension of immunities, and a quid pro quo may be granted or inflicted. Thus,
overly restrictive limitations on diplomatic immunity in the United
States might result in a reciprocal loss in the broad immunity enjoyed by United States diplomatic agents in some countries.
Numerous attempts in Congress have been made to restrict diplomatic immunities more severely than does the DRA. 104 All these
efforts failed, in part, because Congress likely felt it would be unwise to radically narrow immunities, since such action could result
in unfavorable repercussions for the United States personnel abroad.
As a consequence, United States law remained fundamentally unchanged since 1790.
Passage of the DRA, making the Vienna Convention the sole
basis of diplomatic immunity in the United States, brings United
States law into line with that of most other countries. Accordingly,
the repercussions for United States diplomatic personnel abroad
will not be as significant as would result from the adoption of more
restrictive limitations. Moreover, the DRA gives the President the
authority to extend or circumscribe the immunities of various diplomatic missions on a reciprocal basis. 105 Such a provision is
necessary in part because many governments may accord American diplomats greater immunity from local jurisdiction than is required by the Vienna Convention. In order to retain this greater
degree of immunity, the United States must have the flexibility to
provide a reciprocal degree of immunity to foreign diplomats in this
country. Moreover, greater protection must be provided for
foreign diplomats from non-democratic countries that are not signatories to the Vienna Convention to ensure protection of United
10
• See H.R. 8, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925) (to provide relief for the state of New York);
S. 3964, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (to amend the traffic laws of Washington, D.C., eliminating immunity for violations of such laws connected with foreign legations); H.R. 3977, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (to abolish diplomatic immunity); H.R. 10988, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956) (to establish United States liability for injuries to persons and property caused by the
negligent or wrongful act of an individual granted diplomatic immunity by the United
States).
105
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 4, 92 Stat. 809 (1978) provides:
The President may, on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms as he may
determine, specify privileges and immunities for members of the mission, their
families, and the diplomatic couriers of any sending state which result in more
favorable treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna
Convention.
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States diplomatic personnel from harassment and arbitrary application of local law. 106 In the Soviet Union, for example, United
States diplomatic personnel are accorded full diplomatic immunity
which is broader than the immunity provided in the Convention.
According to the Vienna Convention, the Soviet Union can restrict
such immunities on a reciprical basis if immunities of Soviet personnel in the United States are similarly restricted. 107 As the President is granted authority to extend greater immunity than that required by the Vienna Convention, this situation can be remedied.108
Permitting less favorable treatment than the Convention provides is also necessary to secure protection of United States diplomats abroad. Where certain nations restrict the immunities of
United States diplomatic personnel, similar action may be taken by
the President. Although the ORA specifically states that the provisions of the Vienna Convention shall apply to nonratifying nations, 109 thus expressing the intent that provisions of the Convention be applied uniformly to all nations, some flexibility is needed.
Although administering different standards for various countries
might prove difficult and possibly result in discriminatory and arbitrary applications, it is clear that the need to ensure proper protection of diplomatic personnel abroad requires presidential discretion
in this area.
D. Dismissal of Action Against Individuals Entitled to Immunity

The 1790 statute provided that the institution of an action against
a diplomat would be deemed void .110 The operation of this provision was unclear: a diplomat might have assumed that he must
notify the Department of State, appear in court to present his defense, or simply do nothing. Appearing in court and presenting a
defense on the merits could have proved detrimental to the diplomat, as in at least one case such action was deemed a waiver of
diplomatic immunity. 111 The ORA clarifies the procedure for asserting the diplomatic immunity.
The DRA provides a specific mechanism for dismissal of actions
by a judicial tribunal or administrative agency where diplomatic
immunity is found.11 2 Although the diplomat has an absolute legal
10 • H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1978).
·
101 See note 62 supra.
108 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 215-16.
10
• Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
110 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976) (repealed 1978).
111 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927).
11 • Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 5, 92 Stat. 809 (1978).
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defense if suit is brought under circumstances not sanctioned by
the Vienna Convention, it is the responsibility of the diplomat to
assert that defense affirmatively, as permitted by law or applicable
rules of procedure, to avoid a default judgment. 113 Thus, the burden is appropriately placed on the diplomatic community to seek
dismissal of an action. It is the role of the Department of State simply to verify the status of each individual and not to stand as representative for the diplomatic community .114
Unlike the 1790 statute, the ORA does not subject any person
who obtains or executes a writ or process against a diplomatic
agent to fine or imprisonment. 115 Such a harsh approach, disregarding intent or knowledge of diplomatic status, is apparently not
deemed necessary to prevent interference with the diplomatic
function.
E. Amending the Judiciary Code

Under past law, the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction in "all actions or proceedings against ambassadors or
other public ministers of foreign states or their domestic servants. " 116 The ORA extends the jurisdiction of federal district
courts to encompass such actions.11 7 The Supreme Court retains
original jurisdiction, as required by article III, section 2 of the Constitution, 118 but the Act largely removes the burden of such litigation from the Court's docket. 119
Federal district courts formerly had original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, over "all actions and proceedings against consuls or vice consuls of foreign states. " 120 The ORA extends the
jurisdiction of the district courts to suits involving members of a
mission or members of their families. 121 Thus, this amendment
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). See also S. REP. No. 958, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
115 See 22 U .S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). However, few if any cases imposed fines or
imprisonment for the violation of this statute.
11 • 28 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1978).
11 7
It has long been established that the Congress may not deny to the Supreme Court
jurisdiction which is expressly granted to it by the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(l Cranch) 137 (1803). However, from the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, inferior federal
courts have been given concurrent jurisdiction over certain cases of which the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction, and such legislation has been consistently upheld. United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884); Bors v. Preston, lll U.S. 252 (1884).
118
U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 in part provides that "[i]n all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls ... the Supreme Court shall have the original jurisdiction."
11
• H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1970).
1
zo 28 U .S.C. § 1351 (1976) (amended 1978).
121
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8, 92 Stat. 810 (1978).
11•
11
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provides a district court forum for suits against diplomatic personnel in all cases where such suits would be allowed under the DRA
and the Vienna Convention. Additionally, the term "all actions and
proceedings" appearing in the Code is qualified by the word
''civil'' which clarifies the jurisdiction of the federal district courts
and removes the prohibition on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
by state courts; 122 The DRA thereby makes it clear that the state
courts are not denied jurisdiction to enforce the criminal laws of
the states against members of a mission and their families under
circumstances where existing laws do not provide immunity from
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. 123
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States has taken a significant step toward modernizing its antiquated laws with respect to diplomatic immunity. This
legislation will have the salutory effect of replacing the absolute
immunity conferred upon all diplomatic personnel regardless of
rank or function, with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, thus making the degree of immunity somewhat commensurate with the foreign representative's rank and responsibilities. Accordingly, considerable numbers of lower echelon embassy personnel will be held responsible for their wrongful
conduct that injures American citizens or ignores local law.
While repeal of the 1790 statute restricts the scope of immunity
conferred, it will not provide protection for an aggrieved victim of a
tortious action or broken contract involving members of the diplomatic community in all circumstances. The DRA attempts to
provide some measure of redress for Americans injured in certain
accidents by requiring the members of the diplomatic community
accredited to the United States to maintain motor vehicle, aircraft,
and vessel insurance. This insurance provision becomes an effective tool through the mechanism for direct enforcement of the policy against the insurer. However, while liability insurance may
ease some of the problems, particularly involving automobiles, it
does not provide compensation damages due to other types of tortious acts committed by diplomats.
The Act provides for some necessary flexibility in the scope of
immunity, for it empowers the President to extend on a reciprocal
basis more or less favorable treatment than is required by
the Vienna Convention. In countries where due process is unavailable and American diplomats need protection from the biases of
122
123

28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976) (amended 1978).
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8, 92 Stat. 810 (1978).
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local law, the President should have discretionary authority to
negotiate with such countries. The Act also confers upon the federal district courts concurrentjurisdiction with the Supreme Court
to decide suits brought against key diplomatic personnel.
It is clear that the laws of the United States relating to diplomatic
immunity were in need of amendment to bring them into line with
the Vienna Convention and current international practice. The
enactment of the DRA helps to assure meaningful results in this
long-ignored, vital area.
-Paul F. Roye

